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Abstract 
This paper proposed a new architecture model of volatile data forensic. The model applied to all the volatile data 
sources is a general model. It can rebuild the evidence data fragment to chains of evidence which contains the 
behavior characteristics, so as to assist investigators to do case analysis. With the accumulated experience, the model 
can help judicial officers to intelligently analyze the same type of computer crimes, and based on currently available 
information to predict the impending crimes.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
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1. Introduction 
In order to effectively combat computer crime, how to obtain reliable and strong evidence has become 
a key factor in the detection of crime. But with the development of forensic science, the evidences of 
crime forensic not only came from the information in computers, but in various types of electronic 
devices contain digital information relevant to the case. This resulted in the concept of digital forensic.  
In the early time, digital forensic is on permanent storage devices to extract and analyze data, one 
typical representative of such devices is hard disks. Until the summer of 2005, Digital Forensic Research 
Workshop sponsored a memory analyze challenge. As deeply analyzing from the original physical 
memory image (source file from windows 2000) can get a lot of information which can not be obtained 
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from stable storage medium such as hard disks. After that, the analysis, discussions, researches, and 
development tools on original image of physical memory became a new hot area of digital forensic.  
Currently a well-known conception of volatile data is the information which will be lost when system 
is shutdown or neglect and have been recorded in main memory or temporary file on hard disk. RFC3227 
[1] shows the order of volatility. For memory is typically volatile data carrier, we make the memory of 
electronic devices as an example of volatile data and give precise descriptions of this model in section 4. 
2. Related work 
Following the success of 2005 DFRW memory analyze challenge, researches of volatile data forensic 
has been further developed. Especially the research and analysis methods for memories from various 
electronic devices are improved rapidly and endless.  
After six years of forensic science development, forensic practitioners have been capable of extracting 
large amounts of forensic information from the original memory dump. The related technology includes 
the way of analysis and extraction of structured information on the memory. For instance, [2] can extract 
process, configuration, and network activity information from any of the Windows NT operating systems. 
Similar researches have dug up a deeper level of content from memory dump. Such as [3] has a need for 
more memory forensic techniques to extract user-entered data retained in various Windows applications 
like the Windows command prompt. The contribution of [4] is a new technique for extracting sensitive 
information that can not be extracted by string matching-based techniques. [5] [6] provides the methods 
of finding Rootkits and registry information which have been released from windows memory dump. The 
memory research domain in Linux [7] [8] or mobile phone [9] also achieved similar achievements.  
By analyzing the above related research results, we could easily find: the research results provided the 
reliable and effective realization of achieving the volatile data and analyzing the format of the original 
memory dump. These results also became important references and foundational works that we used to 
further identify volatile data and analysis criminal actions in the proposed model. 
3. Volatile Data Forensic Model 
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Fig. 1. (a) the abstract structure of volatile data forensic model; (b) the abstract structure of volatile data forensic model 
As figure 1, the volatile data forensic model in this paper comprises five layers. In order to accomplish 
the functions of each layer, we have established a sensitive information database and another criminal 
behavior database. 
3.1. The first layer: extraction layer 
In the evidence collection process of the actual criminal cases scene, the investigators search and 
retrieve possible evidence of importance with their experience and forensic science techniques. But the 
process requires investigators protect the scene and save the original form before sorting and classifying 
the criminal environment to extract further evidence. 
Similarly, the main task of getting the first layer of the model in this paper is to remove the noise data, 
which is unstable and unable to produce significance information, only extract the available information 
in the volatile data source (usually as a binary data source) by means of the specific treatment. Due to the 
difference of data sources (such as different operating systems have different memory management), the 
extracted available information is also different in the aspects of natural types, orders and so on. In order 
to analyze the available volatile data source effectively, we need to package all the available volatile data 
going through this layer into a unified format. The reasonable definition of serialization format will help 
the disordered volatile data to become effective evidence on the court in the future. 
3.2. The second layer: recognition layer 
We still refer to the on-site work of getting evidence in actual criminal cases. In the process of forensic 
investigation, investigators do not extract and bring back everything as evidence. On the contrary, 
investigators only save items those that may have a role in detecting cases as evidence for the next further 
investigation.  
In the course of the investigation of digital evidence, we should also follow this rule, particularly in the 
evidence gathering of volatile data in order to reconstruct the evidence chain. Because the amount of 
forensic data source after aggregating itself is massive, if we analyze one by one, the overheads is 
unthinkable. It is the same as real crime scene investigation, investigators need to explore many times, we 
need the iteration process to find those which is helpful for us to solve the case, or useful as evidence of 
sensitive information.  
3.3. Sensitive information database 
As the second layer we have completed to identify the sequence of sensitive information in 
the volatile data that requires the existence of a knowledge database as the basis for identification of 
sensitive information, with the serialized data to match. With the identification of sensitive 
information related to the contents of the definition of 1 in the following description. 
Definition 1: Sequence of any information contained n characteristic descriptors; Characterization 
of any item has a finite number of discrete values. With iT stand for the i characteristic descriptor set 
of values ( 0 i n< ≤ ) and { }nT stands for all the characteristics that describe a collection of items of value. 
Then any sequence information can be expressed 
as 11 12 1 21 22 2 1 2{{ , ,..., },{ , ,..., },...,{ , ,..., }}n n nx t t t t t t t t tκ λ η= ( 11 12 1 1, ,...,t t t Tκ ∈ , 21 22 2 2, ,...,t t t Tλ ∈ ,…,
1 2, ,...,n n n nt t t Tη ∈ ). All sensitive information in the database gives the sensitive information must meet a 
number of characteristic values, as 1 2{ , ,..., }sY y y y= . For any iy Y∈ , there is a feature descriptor set of m 
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values { }mT , iy include m characteristic items, { } { },0m nT T m n⊆ < ≤ . Define the mapping f :
{ } { }m nT T→ for the same features characterize the mapping entry. As { }mT is the subset of { }nT , then 
any { }j mT T∈ can be found only { }i nT T∈ in the mapping. If there is ky Y∈ , for any { }j mT T∈ , jT :
ky = 1 2{ , ,..., }j j jt t t φ , { }j nT T∈ , sequence information x in the lT , which values are 
1 2{ , ,..., }l l lt t t ϕ , 1 2{ , ,..., }j j jt t t φ is subset of 1 2{ , ,..., }l l lt t t ϕ . If those conditions were satisfied, we consider that 
x  is the sensitive information. 
3.4. The third layer: association layer 
The association analysis layer is responsible for the reconstruction of the evidence chain. With the use 
of time, location, maps, and other factors, as measured factors on the second layer to obtain sensitive 
data for conducting an analysis of the association between each other. The known relevance rules of the 
evidence will help analysis’ organize specific information together, which constitute the behavioral 
characteristics of chain of evidence. The following definition 2 is the association between the sensitive 
events.
Definition 2: For any two-sensitive events ,Α Β , α is the feature descriptor for the characterization 
of Α , β is the feature descriptor for the characterization of Β . Setting maps ( f : Α→Β ) are the 
two interrelated features of the mapping descriptor, if there α ∈Α , β ∈Β is enough to meet β is
on the map ( )fβ α= . Then we say that sensitive eventsΑ、Β  are associated. 
3.5. The fourth layer: match layer 
Matching layer can achieve two aspects of the work. The first is to match the evidence chain that 
obtained through dealing with the association layer and the other one in the criminal behavior database. 
The other is to visual the remaining evidence chain that is not in the behavior database, but may be 
helpful to investigate the case. As the information in this layer is presented in the format of evidence 
chain, it is with a certain logic relationship, which is helpful for investigators to reason, reconstruct the 
case, detect the case finally, and gather evidence in court. 
3.6. Criminal behavior database 
Establishment of criminal behavior database (i.e., chain of evidence database) is the purpose of 
summing up the experience by cracked criminals. Creating such database not only avoid those available 
data repositories become “data tombs" (data archives that are seldom visited) after closing a case but also 
every time collect criminal actions as "chain of evidence” which used to help an analysis of evidence and 
case reconstruction.  
3.7. The fifth layer: analysis layer 
As the final layer of the whole architecture model, analysis layer would continue to accomplish the 
work came from association layer. In this layer, by intelligent analysis, it was confirmed that whether the 
part of evidence chains that would not be recognized through criminal behavior database can be forensic 
evidence. If the results obtained from extraction layer were not satisfactory. Our work should go back to 
the second layer and reordered the range of the sensitive information until finding a reasonable set of 
sensitive information. 
After one case closed, all valid chains of evidence on further abstraction and cutting will be uploaded 
to the criminal behavior database, which could be the foundation for uncovering other similar cases in 
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future. With the expansion of information and the constant improvement of the criminal behavior 
database, we will be more knowledgeable of criminal behavior models and characteristics in similar cases. 
In the near future, we will uncover more methods to restrain crimes and even prevent crimes by further 
analysis of the criminal behavior database. 
4. Conclusions 
The significance of this model is that we fully utilized the research results of volatile data analysis and 
extraction which are more close to the physical level, and those results may be abstracted to be one layer 
function of a general model which adapt to any type of sources. Thereby, the previous situation of digital 
evidence extraction is avoided, which only use a specific analysis and extraction methods to analyze and 
extract the available information from data sources. In addition, we also proposed: the chain of evidence 
from criminal process will be restored and matched with features of criminal acts in the 
database, which can be accumulated past experience of handling similar cases as the basis for the 
future, to solve the investigators simply by their own experience. Our model not only has a strong 
universal but it will aim at intelligent analysis to face the growing and massive information in digital 
evidence, which will dramatically change the extraction and analysis work of existing forensic patterns. 
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